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STATUS OF MUNICIPAL ENTERPRISES.
Gas and electric plants, tramway and telephones held and oper-
ated by a city are business enterprises ;42 and when a public cor-
poration goes into bfusiness it is peculiarly amenable to the general
rule stated by the Supreme Court: "The same principles of right
and justice which prevail between individuals, should control in
the construction and carrying out of contracts between the gov-
ernment and individuals." 43
These enterprises are in a sense private property as distin-
guished from municipal buildings and other accessories of gov-
ernment.
Without discussing how far the governmental property of a
city is exempted froin the pursuit of creditors,
44" it appears that
these undeftakings are not immune. They can be mortgaged
and so foreclosed on default. They can be taken in execution of
judgment.
It is not necessary to consider here questions regarding the con-
tinuance of service in such eventualities, though I note a recent
decision to the effect that an undertaking deemed to be of public
necessity-waterworks in this case-should not be sold for taxes,
but should be placed in a receiver's hands.
45
DISCONTINUANCE OF MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP.
A public service when once installed is likely to be maintained.
Discontinuance of municipal ownership will usually mean the
transfer of an undertaking to another body, and not its abandon-
ment.
Of voluntary discontinuance it is only necessary to say that
when a city has embarked on an undertaking by permission of
42 See Baily v. Philadelphia, 184 Pa., 594; Illinois Trust Co. v. Kansas
City, 76 Fed. Rep., 282.
43 United States v. Utah & Nevada Stage Co., 199 U. S., 423. See also
-Little Falls, etc. Co.v. Little Falls, 102 Fed. Rep., 663.
44 See Meriwether v. Garrett, 108 U. S., 472.
45 Covington v. District of Highlands, 113 Ky., 612.
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the State, it cannot abolish or sell it without the State's consent4 B
Involuntary discontinuance may conceivably result from private
action-foreclosure and sale under a mortgage, for example-
or it may be caused by the State.
Remarking that the State may oust a city from the manage-
ment of an undertaking by reason of maladministration, the
municipality saving of course whatever property rights may have
become vested in it, we pass to what may become a question of
interest.
In case the State brings several undertakings-tramways, for
example-under a single public authority, and one of them is
owned by a city, is there a mere shifting of control from one
political corporation to another, or is there a taking of com-
munal property calling for compensation?
As the undertaking is in a sense the private property of the
community, and so is not subject to the State's pleasure, it would
seem that substantial compensation is due whenever the change of
owners involves a pecuniary detriment to the community.
When an undertaking is returning a profit the city should not
be forced to part with it without indemnity for loss of revenue.
Furthermore, an undertaking which the community have paid
for for their own use may, in the merger, contribute to the larger
district a very substantial benefit-for example, when a municipal
power plant is capable of serving outlying territory lying within
the new district. In such case the legislature should provide for
compensating the community for their excessive contribution;
for, as they would not have taxed themselves originally for a
plant for outlying service, they should not be compelled to donate
a going concern to this service.
ENTERPRISES TOO EXTENSIVE FOR MUNICIPAL
CAPACITY
The municipal ownership programme assumes that the city is
competent to administer all the services proposed. The assump-
tion is correct in respect of gas, electric, telephone and tramway
enterprises performing service only within a town, but when these
serve a larger territory we have to consider whether, if public
ownership be planned, the owner should not be a political cor-
poration of broader jurisdiction.
46 See Huron Water Works Co. v. Huron, 7 S. Dak., 9; Indianapolis
v. Gas Co., 144 Fed. Rep., 640.
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The service area of a private company is within the discretion
of the legislature. The company can be readily authorized to
maintain a single undertaking in any number of political divisions
-- cities, villages, townships, even in two or more States. How-
ever extensive its range it will nowhere conflict with any political
corporations but will be subject in each division to whatever local
governance may be requisite and lawful.
IHow is it with a city? Each of our communal subdivisions
has its peculiar place in a system of government. Therefore,
in turning from the company to the city .we turn from an elastic
to a rigid body, from a voluntary organization of commercial
purpose to an institution vested with the dominant duty of gov-
erning a community and subject to the law of political jurisdic-
tion.
A city, like every other governmental organization, acts within
a defined area, and is generally incompetent to exercise jurisdic-
tion beyond it. Commonly jurisdiction and territory are con-
terminous.
Does this rule forbid a town to perform utility services beyond
its limits? Or is this permissible on the theory that it pertains to
business and not to politics? Applying the theory of business
capacity, there seems to be no constitutional objection to one town
acting as a mere purveyor to another. When A contracts to
supply so many gallons of water to B it acts simply as a vendor of
commodities. It exercises no jurisdiction in B's territory but
simply delivers water to a system which B owns and administers.
So the municipal proprietor of a lighting plant might deliver gas
or electricity to its neighbors' distributing plant.
Furthermore, a city might, without causing embarrassment,
operate certain utilities in a suburban district having no municipal
government of its own.
4 7
Is not a different question presented in case -a city seeks to
operate an undertaking in and for another town?-when one
political corporation proposes to exercise in another functions for
which the latter is equipped? Can there be properly attributed
to Metropolis, whose political jurisdiction is rigidly delimited by
metes and bounds, a jurisdiction of indefinite extent which,
though of a business nature, involves a certain use and control of
streets by metropolitan boards and their employees and a cor-
responding supersession of local authority?
47 See Henderson v. Young, 83 S. W., 583, Ky., 1904:
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The question has not been sufficiently adjudicated to enable us
to say positively how far one city can be empowered to exercise
such jurisdiction in another, at all events against the latter's wish.
But, constitutional questions apart, I think a brief survey of the
utilities under consideration-especially great tramway and tele-
phone systems-wil'show how unlikely is their public ownership
to be vested in single cities.
We need not anticipate many serious attempts at city ownership
of telephones in this country.
Few communities would be satisfied without the long distance
service; and this a city could not administer effectively. Yet a
company would find an exclusively long distance service unprofit-
able; and, if it operated in local competition with a municipal ser-
vice, both would probably suffer.
If the service is to be performed by the public it is likely to be
managed by States, perhaps even by the United States.
The embarrassments involved in municipal operation of widely
ramifying undertakings are notably illustrated in the case of
tramways.
Originally designed, as a rule, for urban passenger service, these
now usually serve suburban districts, frequently link groups of
towns, and are reaching out for freight and mail. Originally
laid along highways exclusively, many of them now occupy long
lengths of their own right of way, often competing with the short,
and occasionally with the long service of great railway systems.
In some cases they have been a~quired by these systems, and the
electrification of railways will bring the two services still closer.
The capaoity of a municipal corporation to own a great steam
railway was considered by the courts nearly forty years ago,
when the city of Cincinnati took advantage of a statute authoriz-
ing it to finance the construction of a line from that city to Chat-
tanooga, Tennessee, called the Cincinnati Southern Railway, and
to administer its interests by a board of trustees.
Judge Dillon justly says that the decision of the Supreme Court
of Ohio sustaining the act,48 subverted "all previous notions of
the appropriate powers, functions and duties of municipalities." 40
48 Walker s,. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St., 14.
49 Municipal Corporations, p. 229, note.
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The decision has not found favor elsewhere,'
0 and it seems to be
discredited even in Ohio."
But if, for some reason or other, a city might be invested with
capacity merely to own a great railroad, it would be difficult to
devise a lawful and effective scheme for municipal operation.
The considerations of public convenience and economical man-
agement which long since welded short railways into trunk lines
are quite as influential in the case of tramways, and I assume that,
as a rule, a public ownership scheme will not find favor unless it
preserves this unity of service. How, then, shall unity be main-
tained? Shall a single city manage a system serving its neigh-
bors? Shall two or more cities exercise joint control? Or shall
some larger political corporation specially created for the purpose
override all the municipalities interested and assume entire con-
trol ?
In Great Britain we find examples of single management of a
sort.
Manchester, for instance, operates an extensive system in this
way: It leases from certain suburban district councils the lines
within their limits, paying "an annual rental sufficient to pay off
in the twenty-one years' term of the lease the capital outlay of the
local authority in connection with the purchase and reconstruc-
tion of the tramway." Manchester assumes "the entire financial
obligation in connection with the tramways" in question, and is to
"maintain the tramways during the period of the lease, and to
hand over the track in good condition to the local authorities at
the end of twenty-one years." " It also operates lines in Salford
and Ashton under running power agreements with these corpora-
tions, retaining out of the receipts the operating expenses only.'
2
The Manchester plan might serve in this country for a system
comprising a town and its suburbs, but it would be inadequate for
our great systems.
Joint management by two or more towns might, perhaps, be
worked out on paper.
But either single or joint municipal administration would tend
to arouse jealousies and conflicts as to the apportionment of re-
ceipts and expenses, and would increase that tendency to confused
50 See Sun Publishing Co. v. New York, 152 N. Y., 259; Attorney
General v. Pingree,1 20 Mich., 550.
51 See State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St., 120.
52 ,Royal Comm. on London Traffic, III, pp. 849, 850.
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accounting which is observed even when a town is managing an
enterprise of purely local interest.
The truth is the tramway in this country has outgrown or is
rapidly outgrowing municipal capacity for its administration.
If the private companies now owning the great systems are to
be supplanted, these are not likely to be split up among the towns
they serve.
Their unity will be maintained, if not extended. Each system
will be managed by a public corporation specially created, or else
they will be consolidated and operated by the State.
In the former case the State would probably delimit districts
conterminous with the given undertaking, which would be admin-
istered by a board of control, following in a general way the pre-
cedents suggested by the districts and boards created for levee,
drainage, and irrigation works.
MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF PRIVATE INTERESTS
Having considered the capacity of municipalities in respect of
public utility works, we come to the effect of municipal ownership
schemes upon the persons whose property or business wii be
affected by their execution.
TRADERS
When a political corporation engages in a business within the
normal field of private enterprise, private traders may complain
that they are subjected to a competition which is ,unfair because
their public rival draws its capital from the community and is. not
committed to- profit-seeking.
The spread of municipal trading in Great Britain has provoked
such complaints from plumbers, stone-cutters,. manufacturers of
electrical supplies and others whose business has been affected by
the production and sale of their commodities by public.authorities.
English publicists of high standing voic6 d well-supported opinion
that private enterprise has already been affected by municipal
trading and would be seriously compromised by its enlargement-
a welcome result, be it noted, from the socialist's standpoint.
Like conditions in this country will bring like complaints.
There seems to be no redress at common law for damage thus
done by private business by an authorized public competitor; in-
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deed, it remains to be determined whether a private trader would
have sufficient standing in court to prove a lack of authority.
It would seem, however, that in case a public corporation should
compete in a manner which the law condemns as unfair between
private parties it could be called to account.
It is interesting to note in this relation that in France merchants
are not without opportunity to complain of public competition.
For example, at the instance of the bakers of Poitiers, the Coun-
cil of State set aside a municipal project to subsidize a co6perative
bakery."3
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANIES
The enterprises chiefly affected by the municipal ownership
programme are those conducted by public service companies, but
we need not consider in detail the bulky and complex body of law
relating to these companies. The present purpose will be served
by indicating their relation to the programme in a very general
way.
As their undertakings are distinguished from ordinary business
enterprises in being open to private activity only by the State's
permission, the companies are correspondingly differentiated from
the ordinary business corporation, and it is material to define their
distinguishing characteristics and their leading types.
The Operating Company
All public service companies occupying streets are in a sense
lessees in respect of the premises, inasmuch as the streets belong
to the community, and when occupation is granted for a term they
are somewhat like lessees in the quality of their tenure.
But this general relation of lessor and lessee is quite different
from the one created by the formal lease of an undertaking by a
city to an operating company. Here is municipal ownership in
its simplest form, and regarding the law of the matter it is only
necessary to say at present that it is, broadly speaking, conven-
tional, being embodied in the terms of the contract.
Public ownership with private operation upoh terms at once
fair to the community and attractive to operating companies is
coming into favor as a reasonable basis for the installation of cer-
tain undertakings.
53 P. Mercier: Les E.xploitations Municipales en France, p. 226.
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The Proprietary Company
The majority of the companies are, as regards the community,
proprietors of the undertakings they operate, though as we de-
velop their position we shall perceive that in some respects pro-
prietorship of public utility works differs from ownership of
ordinary property, being a peculiar interest defined by public
grant-an interest always limited in quality and generally in"
duration.
There are certain companies with special charters, but most-
of them are chartered under general laws applicable to all their
kind in the State, and this practice is now embodied in the gen-
erality of State Constitutions.
The general standing and capacity of a company is measured'
by the quality of its franchise to perform the given service, and'
it must be understood that whatever limitations inhere in or are-
attached to this franchise are largely due to the company's use-
of the highways.
Monopoly franchises are now rarely granted. Indeed most
States forbid them.
Perpetual franchises are also exceptional in these days. In,
some States they are forbidden by the constitution. In others_
they are discouraged by public opinion.
A franchise is usually granted for a fixed term, often with pro-
vision for one or more renewals. This is a favored form of
concession to tramway companies. Btit in Massachusetts the
concession "is perpetual in theory, though in point of fact revoc-
able at any time.''54
In some States the Constitution makes all franchises subject
to amendment and revocation. In others, charters and general
laws frequently contain a like provision.
Note here that while the forfeiture of a franchise through legal
proceedings, or its repeal in virtue of a reserved power, may
give the city an opportunity to continue the undertaking on its.
own account, it does not necessarily transfer the company's plant
to the public.
Repeal of a franchise simply means the cutting off of a cor-
porate privilege, and even its forfeiture does not necessarily in-
volve the confiscation of the property acquired under it.55
4 Report of Massachusetts Committee on Street Railways, 1898.
55 See People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y., 1.
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How far the processes of repeal or forfeiture can be effectively
employed by the State to depreciate the franchise value of a cov-
-eted undertaking, may become a question of practical concern.
Public service companies differ from the ordinary run of pri-
vate corporations in being subject to a peculiar State regulation
covering such matters as the charges, method and quality of ser-
vice, etc. The degree of regulating power is measured by the
terms of the charter and by general rules consistent with consti-
tutional principles, and with such charter privileges or exemptions.
as amount to valid contracts between the State and the company.
This brief survey of public service companies shows that they
perform services which the community might undertake on its-
own account and are subject to responsibilities to the public in
consideration of the privileges they receive, and that they are
corporations of limited scope, and often of brief, occasionally of
precarious tenure.
Because of these things it is perhaps not surprising that the
propaganda for municipal ownership is more or less disfigured
by a notion that these companies are really public corporations,.
and that private interests therein are comparatively negligible.
The company is not a public corporation, nor will calling it
"quasi-public" affect the measure of its substantial rights. It
represents a group of individuals organized for profit; and this
pecuniary motive should be emphasized in view of the disposition
to exaggerate public, at the expense of private interests. Now it
is true that a public service company "exercises a sort of public
office," and its undertaking "is established primarily for the con-
venience of the people; ' 513 yet such phrases merely emphasize
the public duties of a private corporation.
Much of the company's property is of a peculiar kind, but its.
interests are of substantial and often enormous value. Hence,
whenever a city in executing a municipal ownership 9cheme has.
to reckon with a company it is confronted by private interests
entitled to full protection.
With this preliminary sketch of the public service company let
us consider its relation to municipal ownership projects.
Whenever a municipal ownership scheme touches private inter-
ests we may expect a controversy.
Now, in every controversy it is of prime importance to deter-
mine the parties immediately interested, and intercorporate rela-
11 See -Doniova v. Penn. Co., 199 U. S., 279.
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tions are so common and often so complicated that in some cases
it will require great care and, perhaps, adjudication to determine
the precise company with whom the city has to deal.
It has been decided that a holding company-that is to say, a
company formed to acquire stock of other companies-has no
direct interest in any proceeding for transferring the undertaking
of one of the controlled companies to a public authority. 57
When one company has acquired control of another by pur-
chase of stock the latter is a party interested. And a company
leasing its works would seem to be in like case, though both pur-
chaser and lessor may have claims to recognition. When one
company has been so merged into another as to lose its identity of
course it has no interest.
A company is affected by a municipal ownership scheme when
its income is reduced by municipal competition, or when its
undertaking is actually acquired by a city, either in pursuance of
provisions incorporated in its charter or by way of expropriation
-or ordinary purchase.
A public service company can check municipal competition only
by producing a contract excluding it.
Occasionally we find a service contract with a city of this
kind. 3
More often, however, a company will endeavor to avert com-
petition by alleging a charter contract of monopoly.
In this case it is not enough for a company to show that its
franchise bars out Private competitors. In order to check a
municipal competitor it must present a charter distinctly allowing
it to hold the field against the city. 50
Rarely is a modern service company so strongly entrenched.
Occasionally, however, a company has proved a monopoly ex-
cluding a public competitor,60 and a widespread development of
the municipal ownership programme would doubtless encounter
here and.there monopolies of like breadth.
Furthermore, monopoly of a sort may be shown and yet fail
to support the allegation: While a grant of monopoly may be so
phrased as to comprehend all means of performing a certain
5 Kennebec Water District v. Waterville, 97 Me., 185.
5- Potter County Water Co. v. Borough of Austin, 206 Pa., 297. See
also Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S., 65.
59 Electric Co. v. Newton, 42 Fed. R., 723; Joplin v. Electric Light Co.,
191 U. S., 150; Knoxville Water Co. v. Kvoxville, 200 U. S., 22.
60 Walla Walla v. Water Co., 172 U. S., 1.
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service-such sweeping grants are rare. Thus a gas monopoly is
not equivalent to a general lighting monopoly which would be
impaired in point of law by an electric light service, though in
fact this might greatly depreciate its value.61
Proof of monopoly will not in point of law check municipal
competition when the city has the power to condemn whatever
property is needed. For the legislature in granting a monopoly,
however broad and permanent its terms, does not and cannot re-
lease it from subjection to the eminent domain. But as such a
monopoly has a peculiar, and usually a very high value, its estab-
4ishment in a particular case will increase the cost of a municipal
enterprise-perhaps beyond the city's intention, possibly be-
yond its borrowing powers.
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES
An immediate development of the municipal ownership pyo-
gramme suggests a greater initial activity in acquiring the works
of private companies than in constructing new ones.
The services in question are at present largely performed by
companies, and we should not anticipate a general installation of
competing public works, for it is commonly agreed that as a rule
the best service is more or less monopolistic, and in many cases
municipal competition would mean a contest wherein the city
could disable its rival only by prodigal expenditure.
In these circumstances companies are more concerned with
the possible acquisition of their properties than with municipal
competition.
ACQUISITION BY PURCHASE
When a city negotiates with a public service company under a
mere authority to purchase its works the latter is a free agent in
fact as well as in law.
This authority, however, will frequently be coupled with a
power to expropriate, or, more accurately, the power will be re-
served for use in case negotiation fails. Hence the legal free-
dom of the cbmpany to stand out for its own price may be some-
-what qualified in fact by the threat of expropriation.
Authority to purchase should be carefully safeguarded in the
public interest, for a sentimental zeal for public ownership is
01 Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va., 435.
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quite likely to open a way for owners of unprofitable works, and
there are many such to unload them on the community.
ACQUISITION UNDER CHARTER STIPULATION
Certain companies have constructed Works under a stipulation
that these can be acquired at a future date by the public, which
may be represented by the State itself in the case of such ex-
tensive works as steam railways, and by a city in the cases of
present interest.
When the stipulation involves simply a power to purchase
works at any time, without specifying terms, there is no particular
relation between the company and the city. The latter is merely
invested at the outset with a power that could be conferred in
the future.
A contract is proffered whenever the statute under which a
company acts authorizes a city to acquire the undertaking at a.
fixed or contingent date, and deals with the terms of acquisition,
either defining them or providing a method for their ascertain-
ment, as by arbitration.
While the legislature is wholly incompetent to dictate the meas-
ure of compensation in cases of expropriation, it is, in the matter
of statutory purchase, free to fix the terms in advance, for here
it merely offers a contract. A company accepting this agrees to,
its provisions, and I cite several cases illustrating these provisions
and their interpretation.
The English Tramways Act 2 enables a public authority to
buy out a tramway company "upon terms of paying the then
value (exclusive of allowance for past or future profits of the
undertaking, or any compensation for compulsory sale or other
consideration whatever) of the tramway and all lands, buildings,
works, materials and plants of the promoters suitable and used
by them for the purpose of the undertaking." The House of
Lords has decided that the "tramway" is not synonymous with
the "undertaking," but means simply the structure, and the "then
value" is what it would cost to construct the work at the date of
sale with deduction for depreciation, and does not include rental
value.6 3
62 33-34 Vict., Ch. 78, S. 43.
63 Edinburgh Tramway Co. v. The Lord Provost, 1899 (A. C.), 456;
London Street Tram.-Co. v. London County.Council, 1894 (A. C.), 489.
See also London Tram. Co. v. London County Council, 1905, 1 K. B., 316.
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When the price paid on a statutory purchase is to be determined
"'without enhancement on account of future earning capacity or
good will or on account of the franchise," evidence of past profits
is not admissible.64
In National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City6" the company en-
forced a contract of purchase under a statute which ordered the
city to buy the works at the end of twenty years if no renewal
were effected. Mr. Justice Brewer held that the city did not take
title to the works by operation of the law, leaving the company to
sue for compensation, but must first pay.their "fair and equitable"
value-not the mere cost of reproduction, but the worth of' the
undertaking as a going concern. "It should pay, therefore, not
merely the value of a system which might be made to earn, but
that of a system which does earn." 6  He held that if the city
had become disabled from holding all the property originally con-
templated by the statute, the company was nevertheless entitled
to be paid for its entire property, leaving the city to settle its own
responsibilities later.
Usually acquisition of an undertaking at the.end of a term calls.
for a payment of money to the company, but a contract may be
so framed as to oblige it to seek its reward during the term,
leaving the public authority free. to take possession without pay-
ment.
Before leaving the subject of purchase under charter contract
I call attention to a question of general importance.
When the original scope of an undertaking has been subse-
quently enlarged by statutory authority-as when a company
chartered to serve a city, thereafter, under additional powers,
extends its service to outlying territory-has the city. a right
under the original statute to dismember the .undertaking and
acquire only the urban section, or can it acquire the whole?
In any event, when the undertaking cannot be split up without
loss, the company is entitled to have it treated as a unit to the
extent of insisting upon payment for at least whatever, injury
the taking of a part would inflict upon the remainder.
Returning to the question of municipal power, there is reason
to argue that, by enlarging the scope of the work, the legislature
has impliedly repealed the city's original right of purchase.
64Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 168 Mass., 541.
6r 62 Fed. R., 853.
16 See also Norwich Gas & El. Co. v. Norwich, 76 Conn., 565.
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When the legislature authorized the extension of the work it
should be presumed to have intended the single undertaking to
serve a lrger territory. This greater undertaking the city can-
not dismember by setting up an earlier statute permitting it to
acquire a smaller one'. Nor, under the original contract, can the
city acquire the enlarged-work, for, even if it be constitutionally
competent to perform the service beyond its limits, it cannot do
this without express authority. Its powers will not expand
automatically with the expansion of the company's service. Nor
can the legislature compel the company to sell its additions upon
the terms of the original contract, for they were not made under
those terms.
In these circumstances it appears that the city can be empow-
ered to acquire the whole undertaking only by new legislation
authorizing purchase or expropriation.
ACQUISITION BY EXPROPRIATION
The legislature can authorize the expropriation of any public
utility work, whatever the charter provisions respecting the term
and conditions of the company's 'life, for its property is always
subject to the'eminent domain.
Invariably'a public authority must find its warrant for an ex-
propriation in some act of the legislature. Invariably it must
follow the statutory directions in respect of condemnation pro-
ceedings.
These elementary propositions require no Aiscussion here. We
are concerned with the application of the constitutional rule that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
The legislature cann6t prescribe the amount of compensation,67
nor indicate the principles of assessment, nor can it withdraw this
or-that claim of property from consideration.
6 8
The assessment of compensation is primarily a matter for im-
partial appraisers who, iri Ordinary cases, are usually a jury, but,
unless a jury is required by the Constitution, the'legislature may
authorize the. appointment of commissioners.6 9
Commissioners 'are generally preferable for determining the
complex questions involved in the expropriation of public service
67TPa. R. v. B. & 0. R., 60 Md., 263.
68 Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S., 312.
69 Norwich Gas Co. v. Norwich, 76 Conn., 565.
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companies, and in a case involving both individual and company
property a jury has been designated for one and a commission for
the other.7 0
The expropriation of a public service company by a public
authority differs in some respects from an ordinary exercise of
the eminent domain. i
This usually means a taking of property in order to put it to
a new use-as when farm land is taken for a railway. In the
present case there is no change of use, but simply a change of
owners.
In ordinary cases the property taken is real estate only, but, as
a rule, the real estate interests of a public service company con-
sist largely of easements in public streets and highways-ease-
ments of varying quality and of no value except in connection
with the company's franchise.
Usually, when a strip of land is condemned for a railway or a
street, part of a tract only is acquired, and the.question of conse-
quential injury or benefit to the remainder will be considered in
assessing compensation. Here there is rarely a remainder; an
entire property-a complete business-is acquired.
Usually the eminent domain is exercised by a political corpora-
tion or a public service company against the property of a private
owner. In these circumstances property is frequently somewhat
overvalued by appraisers. But when a community expropriates
a company the Courts may be called upon to correct under-valua-
tions due to prejudice.
The Measure of Compensation.
It must be understood at the outset that there is no compre-
hensive practical test'for compensation. The market value of
the property is to be ascertained, and this is composed of various
elements. Elements of enhancement, elements of depreciation;
none, as a rule, of singular predominance but each more or less
influential.
The elements considered in valuing a strip of farm land taken
for a highway are comparatively simple. In valuing a public
utility work they are very complex. One case involves property
of the commonest sort; the other a business enterprise, distin-
guished from the ordinary in being an undertaking within public
competency which, actually, is confided to private hands.
70 Keniebec Water Dist. v. Waterville, 96 Me., 234.
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Expropriations of gas and electric works and tramways have
been so infrequent in this country that we have no substantial
'body of precise precedents in the matter of compensation.
However, the general principles of assessment are well estab-
lished, and very pertinent applications have been made when a
public authority has acquired waterworks, or has thrown open
toll bridges and turnpikes, or freed navigation from tolls imposed
by chartered companies.
For convenience of consideration let us divide the property of
.a public service company into two parts, the plant and the fran-
chise, though in the last analysis these are generally valued to-
gether as inseparable elements of the whole enterprise.
The plant includes all the tangible property connected with the
work. This is to be valued generally, in the light of its use,
though if any part has a greater value for another use this must
'be allowed; for example land occupied by a gas-holder may have
.a greater value for general business purposes.
In valuing a plant the cost of construction, less depreciation,
and the cost of duplication, may be considered as elements, but
-ot as measures of value.71
It is well settled that a franchise is property for which a com-
-pany is entitled to full compensation in the event of expropria-
tion.72
I have remarked that the municipal ownership programme
-seems to be more inspired by discontent with company manage-
-ment than by confidence in public management, and this animus
is expressed in the contention that corporate franchises should be
lightly estimated'in assessing compensation.
Now the franchises of a public service company are commonly
a most valuable part of its enterprise; indeed, dissociated from
the franchise to perform the particular service, its tangible belong-
ings are frequently of comparatively little value. If, then, fran-
.chises were lightly esteemed investors would suffer a heavy and
unexpected loss.
Fortunately for investors, valid franchises cannot thus be dis-
-paraged, but whenever a company claims a franchise it must show
-' Kennebec Water District v. Waterville, 97 Me., 185; Montgomery
.County v. Bridge Co., 110 Pa. St., 54.
72 See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How., 507; Water Comm. of
White Plains, 176 N. Y., 239; Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States,
148 U. S., 312.
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a precise and valid statutory warrant. The State can allege, and
the Court determine a discrepancy between claim and proof.
The burden of proof is on the claimant; and doubtful claims
are to be resolved in favor of the State, in virtue of the familiar
rule.73
In appraising the franchise of a particular company the precise
terms of the charter are of the first importance, but these are too
variant to be considered here in detail. Suffice it to say that the
value of a particular franchise increases with its duration, with
its liberality in the matter of rates and operating conditions and
with its tendency to promote a monopoly, whether legal or actual.
The campaign for municipal ownership owes much of its
strength and all its virulence to animosity against public service
companies. These are charged with overreaching the community
in getting franchises, with greed and negligence in management.
This is not the place to weigh these charges, but it is worth while
to consider whether in the event of expropriation they can be
lawfully preferred in a condemnation proceeding for the purpose
of depressing the value of franchises.
In this relation the opinion of Judge Lacombe in Consolidated
Gas Co. v. Mayer, Atty. Gen.,74 is of interest. The New York
State Commission of Gas had, in valuing the property of the gas
company for the purpose of fixing its rates, excluded the value of
certain franchises because "they were granted by the people
without compensation." "That is so," said Judge Lacombe.
"The franchises were granted very many years ago, at
a time when there seems to have been no intelligent appre-
ciation of the fact that they might become enormously valuable;
when reckless improvidence was the rule and all sorts of fran-
chises were given away without any provisions for securing to the
State its fair share of unearned increment thereon. Neverthe-
less, when the State offers a franchise to whomever will take it,
without requiring any money return thereon and for the sole con-
sideration that the taker shall promptly, continuously and fully
develop it by the expenditure of his own money, and such offer is
accepted and the terms of the agreement carried out by the taker,
there results a contract, which, with due consideration of all proper
conditions and limitations inherent in the nature of the particular
contract, is as much within the protection of the Constitution as
,3 Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S., 473.
74 N. Y. L. J., June 11, 1906.
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are all other contracts. If the State twenty-five or fifty years
thereafter should say to the taker: 'We were very improvident
in not providing that you should pay us something each year for-
this franchise; therefore, hereafter you shall pay us eight per
cent annually on $Io,ooo,ooo or $20,000,000, or we will evict you.
from the franchise,' it might find itself embarrassed by the pro-
visions of the Constitution in thus undertaking to avoid the results
of its own improvidence.
"A franchise, whatever its value may be, which has not ex-
pired, nor lapsed, nor been in some way forfeited, is property in,
the hands of its holder. There is force in the argument that
when the State says: 'We will value this property at several
millions of dollars when we tax you on it, but at nothing at all
when we fix, the rate you may charge for your product in order
to receive an eight per cent return on your property,' it is seeking
to accomplish by indirect. methods what it might not be able to
accomplish directly."
The Supreme Court of Maine has lately held that when a public
authority expropriates the property of a water company the
actual charges for service may be scrutinized in estimating the
value of its franchise, but it refused to allow evidence tending to
show past overcharges, either for the purpose of suggesting the
liability of the franchise to forfeiture for abuse, or for the pur-
pose of deducting aggregate overcharges from the present value
of the property.7 5
This means that the State cannot take advantage of condemna-
tion proceedings to discipline its companies by giving evidence of
their shortcomings in depreciation of property values. When
discipline is deserved it is to be applied in direct proceedings.
There are public service companies whose valuations of their
property may, in the event of expropriation, be called inflated
because they are based upon an alleged "overcapitalization."
"Overcapitalization" is being widely discussed. Its meaning,
its effect, even its existence in any sense prejudicial to the com-
munity are subjects of controversy. On the one hand it is de-
nounced as a major source of corporate evils. On the other it
is dismissed as unsubstantial, the argument being that whatever
the face value of a stock issue the market price fixes its actual
value, which is the only real matter of importance.
75 Kennebec Water District v. Waterville, 97 Me., 185.
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We need not now thresh out this intricate subject. The ques-
tion of present interest is whether a public service undertaking
may be overcapitalized to the public detriment, and, if so, whether,
in condemnation proceedings, this detriment can be shown in
abatement of compensation.
A claim that any excess of capital over the cost of duplicating
the work, or at least over the original cost less depreciation, is
inflation, denies any value to the franchise. The claim is pre-
posterous. The franchise is property of substantial value, fre-
quently exceeding the value of the tangible property of the com-
pany. The question turns, therefore, on the proper method of
valuing the franchise.
The value depends on its earning power, which depends largely
upon the service charges, and it is settled that these must be
reasonable.
When the charges are within a maximum fixed by a charter
contract, it would seem that their reasonableness is to be pre-
sumed-the company is taking a lawful advantage of its rights. 76
But companies subject to the general obligation to collect no more
than reasonable charges are accused of collecting charges which
are essentially unreasonable because they are fixed with a view to
an income on watered stock-on an excessive valuation of the
franchise.
When capital stock has been issued by a company in conformity
with law-that is to say, by the State's permission-it is not per-
ceived that the issue can be disparaged by the State in a con-
demnation proceeding on the ground that it has worked a detri-
ment to the public. If detriment ensues this is not necessarily
consequent from the issue itself, but is, as I have said, referable
to making it the basis for really exorbitant rates.
Now, whatever can be done with rates in a direct suit involving
their reasonableness, it does not appear that they can be attacked
collaterally in a condemnation proceeding for the purpose of de-
preciating the franchise.
Such proceedings are not apt for the determination of collateral
issues. They are statutory methods for ascertaining a particular
fact, and nothing else. Nevertheless, if a company should back
its claim for compensation by evidence which fairly puts in issue
the reasonableness of its rates, the question would then be perti-
nent.
76 See Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric R., 201 U. S., 529.
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Coming to the appraisement of a public utility work as a whole
I call attention to several points of interest.
The market price of a company's stock has been received in
evidence.77
Such evidence is useful when a price has been naturally main-
tained for a long period, but it is of little account when the price
has fluctuated widely or has been maintained by manipulation.The profits of a business are an evidence of its value 7 8
In the recent expropriation of the waterworks of the New
River Company by the Metropolitan Board of London the com-
pany claimed compensation on the basis of an asserted right to
pay unlimited dividends. The Arbitration Court decided that
dividends were limited to ten per cent per annum,79 and this de-
cision was finally confirmed by the House of Lords, Lord Chan-
cellor Halsbury dissenting. 0 In consequence the company, which
claimed £13,000,000 compensation, received water stock worth
about £6,oooooo.
The uncertainties of business forbid the fixing of compensa-
tion by capitalizing earnings.8' This prohibition works both ways.
The company will not be unduly benefited by a season of pros-
perity or unduly prejudiced by a season of adversity.
Dramatic justice might now and then be meted to companies
by holding them down to valuations of their property in their tax
returns, when the law requires a statement of full value, but true
justice is not spectacular. Tax returns are occasionally perti-
nent, 2 but, as a rule, they have not much evidentiary value.
It is well settled that in assessing compensation no regard is
to be paid to whatever influence the anticipation of expropriation
may have upon the price of the property.
This principle of our law is concisely expressed in a late English
statute :83 "In fixing compensation the Arbitration Court shall not
make any allowance for compulsory sale and shall not take into
account any enhancement or depreciation of the market value of
any stock or shares of the company which, in the opinion of the
77Mifflin Bridge v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. St., 356.
78 See Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S., 312.
79 20 T. L. R., 303.
80 20 T. L. ,R., 687.
81 See National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 62 Fed. Rep., 865.
82 See Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 168 Mass, 541.
83 Metropolis Water Act, 2 Edw. VII, C. 41, S. 23 (8).
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Court, was caused by or resulted from the passing or the antici-
pation of the passing of this Act."
This principle may be of substantial importance to our public
service companies for, if the market price of company stocks
should be- depressed by a threat of expropriation, this will not be
permitted to depress the amount of compensation.
When a State undertakes to regulate the charges of a public
service company the principles for ascertaining that fair valuation
of the business which must be determined in order to obtain a
true basis for charges84 may be studied with advantage in cases
of expropriation.
In a Federal case growing out of the pending controversy over
rates between the gas companies in New York and the State Gas
Commission, Judge Lacombe said: "If, untrammeled by compe-
tition, a company charges a price far above all reasonable cost to
the helpless consumer, who must pay the price or go without,
while it receives an ex6rbitant return on such of its property as is
invested in enterprise, the State may step in and reduce that price
to such sum as will, taking everything into consideration, be a
reasonable return upon what has been adventured in the enter-
prise on the faith of the State's franchises. No one disputes
this proposition." 85
Now, strictly speaking, there is "adventured" in a public utility
enterprise only the money actually expended-the cash invest-
ment with its interest charges. This alone is at risk. But the
learned judge does not mean to measure the value of an under-
taking by the sum actually adventured, for in a later paragraph he
says: "Under the authorities, in fixing the rate to be charged for
'public service' by private corporations, two elements of calcula-
tion are of fundamental importance: What is the true present
value of the property embarked in the enterprise? and, what, in
view of the risks of the business, is a fair annual percentage of
return thereon ?"
"The true present value of the property embarked in the enter-
prise" fairly indicates the constitutional equivalent due to the
owner upon expropriation. He can exact nothing more when
84 See Sinyth v. Ameis, 169 U. S., 466; Milwaukee Electric Ry v. Mil-
waukee, 87 Fed. R., 577; San Diego Land Co. v. I'ational City, 174 U. S.,
739.
85 Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer, N. Y. L. J., June 11, 1906. See also
Richinan v. Gas Co., N. Y. L. J., Aug. 16, 1906.
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this value falls below the sum invested; he need accept nothing
less when the value exceeds the investment.
The several elements and evidences of value tending to enhance
or depreciate compensation, all lead to a single point, the value
of the property in a negotiation which each party is willing, bu-
neither is obliged to consummate. In theory of constitutional
law the just compensation, the fair price payable on the forced
sale is the price supposed to be fixed in open market.
Method of Payment
Regarding the manner of paying compensation we note the
familiar rule of our constitutional law that it must be made or
secured in advance, and pass to the question whether the com-
pany can insist upon being paid in money.
The "compensation" prescribed by our constitutional law has
been generally accepted as meaning money. Doubtless this defini-
tion has been the more readily accepted because our expropria-
tions have not been on so vast a scale as to render cash payments
embarrassing, much less impossible.
But in the event of a widespread development of the municipal
ownership programme there is likely to be a demand that ex-
propriated companies be paid in public obligations, and if public
ownership of the railways be seriously urged its promoters will
contemplate paying in bonds the billions required for their acqui-
sition.
In default of domestic precedents for giving obligations in lieu
of money they are likely to be sought abroad.
Apart from the cases where foreign governments have openly
confiscated property, or have taken it on the more or less plausible
plea of restoring it to its rightful place in the public domain, they
have expropriated recognized private interests without paying
cash, but making a more or less adequate compensation in other
property or in obligations. In this fashion they have dealt with
great agrarian problems and the suppression of serfdom.
Such expropriations are of purely political purpose. They
aim to suppress or ameliorate vicious social conditions, and are
not to be classed with expropriations of private enterprises in
order to exploit them for the public benefit.
Coming to foreign cases akin to our subject, we note that in
the recent acquisition of railways by Switzerland the stockholders
received public obligations in payment. Italy is acquiring lines
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,on like terms; and the Railway Nationalization Law of Japan
-provides for purchase within a period of ten years-the "pur-
-chase money to be delivered within five years from the date of
-purchase, in public loan bonds bearing five per cent interest cal-
•culated at their face-value.""6
In the Metropolis Water Act, 7 authorizing the Metropolitan
'Water Board of London to acquire private waterworks, we find
this specific instance of municipal expropriation without cash
payment: "The sum pay ble to the New River Company as com-
pensation for the transfer of their undertaking shall be dis-
charged wholly in water stock, and the amount thereof shall, in
default of agreement made'in accordance with the permissions of
Section 2 of this Act, be determined by arbitration under this
Act."
Had slavery in the United States been extinguished by law
instead of by war, it may be conceded for the sake of argument
that the huge indemnity due to the owner§ would have been
equitably paid in bonds instead of cash, because, while the owners
might not realize all the money nominally due, the taxpayers
would obtain no pecuniary equivalent whatever for their contri-
bution-making a free gift for a moral consideration.
In authorizing the taking of private property for actual public
use our legislatures have rarely given the Courts opportunity to
review attempts to expropriate property on any other than a cash
basis.
But an early Federal case afforded an opportunity for estab-
lishing a principle. A Pennsylvania statute attempted to oust
settlers from lands acquired under what was known as the Con-
necticut Grant, and to give them other lands as compensation.
The whole Act was declared invalid, and on this point the Court
said: "By the Act the equivalent is to be in land. No just com-
pensation can be made except in money, compensation is a recom-
pense in value, a quid pro quo, and must be in money. True it
is that land or anything else may be a compensation, but then it
must be at the election of the party; it cannot be forced upon
.him."""
s8 Financial and Economic Annual of Japan, 1906, p. 187.
872 Edw. VII, C. 41.
88 Van Hornes Lessee v. Dorrane, 2 Dal], 315.
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In accordance with this principle it has been held that the ex-
propriated party cannot be compelled to accept public obligations
in lieu of money.89
If municipal ownership shall advance, whether it shall move
cautiously or run a course even more swift and reckless than the
earlier public adventures in railways may depend on this very
question as to payment of compensation in bonds. And im-
providence and injustice will be encouraged if public authorities,
instead of being obliged to go into the market for compensation
money on the best terms obtainable, may issue promises to pay
and hand them to the expropriated owners, who must shoulder
the uncertainty of their market value.
If bond payments are valid, the voting body can force promises
to pay upon expropriated owners to any amount within the debt
limit. If they are invalid cash must be borrowed in the market.
The investor will scrutinize the terms and the security offered,
and the attraction of offers will decrease with their volume. In
fine, private capital will be in a position to impose some check
upon public extravagance.
As the law stands whenever the State expropriates the prop-
erty of a public service company compensation means cash, and
nothing else.
TAXATION.
The relation of municipal ownership to taxation, which has
been referred to from time to time, is sufficiently important to
require special consideration, first as to levying taxes upon mu-
nicipal enterprises, and then as to levying taxes in aid of them.
TAXATION OF MUNICIPAL ENTERPRISES
A city will not tax its own enterprises, though, be it noted, if
it acquires an enterprise from a company which has paid taxes
these will be cut off and it will be impelled to make good the
loss from service charges or from new taxes.
The taxing powers of Federal and State authorities, however,
are worth considering.
In South Carolina v. the United States, ° the Supreme Court
held that the State's liquor dispensary system is not an integral
part of its government, and that consequently its liquor traffic is
89 Butler v. Sewer Comm., 39 N. J. L., 665.
90 199 U. S., 463.
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subject to the Federal internal revenue tax, saying: "It is reason-
able to hold that while the [United States] may do nothing to
prevent the full discharge by [a State] of its governmental func-
tion, yet whenever a State engages in business which is of a pri-
vate nature that business is not withdrawn from the taxing
power."
This decision affirms a Federal right to tax whatever business
enterprises may be undertaken by a State or its subordinate
political corporations.
An Australian case is of interest in this relation. Section 114
of the Constitution reads: "The Commonwealth may not impose
any tax on property of any kind belonging to a State." And it
has been held that this precludes the collection of duties on
materials imported for State railways. 91
Coming to a State we find that when it levies a tax on private
corporations the acquisition of their undertakings by municipali-
ties would withdraw these from the operation of the law.
Whenever a State collects taxes from gas, electric and tramway
companies, and these are acquired by cities, the State revenue will
be depleted without being benefited by receipts from service
charges, for these will flow into city treasuries.
Unquestionably a State can, unless restrained by some peculiar
constitutional provision, tax the business enterprises of its cities;
and this may be done either to recoup loss of revenue or to raise
additional funds.
It has been held that property connected with a municipal un-
dertaking and lying in another local taxing district may be there
taxed-for example sources of water supply. 2
Reviewing the position of taxing authorities, their ability to tax
municipal business undertakings and the securities issued therefor
is broadly established. Policy will dictate their course,, and I
should say that taxes are likely to be imposed whenever revenue
from private enterprises is seriously depleted by the transfer of
these to cities, arid, perhaps, will be levied wherever-a city man-
agement yields profitable returns.
TAXATION FOR MUNICIPAL ENTERPRISES
A city will rarely undertake'a public utility work without re-
course to taxation; and it will call for taxes until the returns shall
91 Attorney General v. Collector, 1903 State Rep., N. S. W., p. 115.
92 1Newport v. Unity, 68 N. H., 587. Compare Rochester v. Rush, 80
N. Y., 302; People v. Hess, 157 N. Y., 42.
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have paid the original cost and meet the yearly expenditure.
In some cases this condition will be long deferred. In others
-it may never be reached because of mismanagement. When the
:management aims to cheapen service at the taxpayer's expense it
will not be looked for.
In case a city acquires the works of public service companies
from which it has collected an annual revenue, this will cease,
Unless it obtains a sufficient yearly surplus from receipts and
.applies this to make good the loss, it will be impelled to replenish
the treasury by new or higher taxes.
The new burden will fall imediately upon the visible taxpayers
-the property owners, biit a great body who may view this com-
*placently, thinking they pay no taxes because they receive no tax
bills, will not wholly escape; in paying rent they bear a part of
the burden,
Taxpayers themselves are by no means equally equipped to
.safeguard their interest in the municipal ownership programme.
Male residents of voting age have at least their own ballots, Non-
Tesidents, minors and, as a rulle, women have none.
The development of municipal ownership in Great Britain has
provoked q peculiar grievance, which may be duplicated here,
Rgilway companies complain that municipal taxation of their
property is increased to finance competing public tramways, as to
which their widely scattered stockholders have no opportunity to
-vote.
In this country manhood suffrage is the rule in municipal as in
'State affairs, and the occasional criticism that this imposes unjust
burdens on the taxpaying class is set aside, if not answered, by
saying that any economic injustice is slight in comparison with the
-political injustice that would follow the restriction of the suffrage
to substantial taxpayers.
But if cities are to embark upon great business enterprises re-
•quring @normous funds for their promotion and calling for thrift
in ftir management, this opinion may not serve. We may con-
templ te the. advisability of giving greater weight to taxpayers in
stuch pases.
Whether a municipal ownership scheme shall deal fairly or
unfairly with the body of taxpayers is largely a matter of legis-
lative discretion, but the individual taxpayer has a legal right to
enjoin the collection of tax unlawfully levied.
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When the illegality consists in a departure from the provisions
'of a valid statute the city is simply required to alter its procedure.
When the tax is unconstitutional it must be abandoned.
CONCLUSIONS
An American city is constitutionally competent to own and
.operate gas and electric works, telephones and tramways for com-
-mon use; provided the cost be within the municipal debt limit.
But the programme for municipal operation, and, indeed, for
-municipal ownership as well, seems likely to be shortened, sooner
-or later, by cutting out the tramway and the telephone as being
too extensive for effective management by a merely urban
authority. This will place these great utilities in a class with
steam railroad and telegraph lines, so far as the question of public
,operation is concerned.
None of the undertakings embraced in the programme may be
-forced upon the city by the State. The initiative belongs to the
community which, as a rule, must express its wish by a popular
vote.
A city cannot, however, proceed without the State's permission.
This the legislature may grant by a general statute, but the better
-practice requires a community to submit its project to a central
,authority.
An undertaking belonging to a city is in a sense its private prop-
-erty and is, in some aspects, a business enterprise.
Being a business enterprise, the city, in conducting it, is largely
:governed by the rules of commercial law; yet, because the city is
a part of the government, it can rarely manage the undertaking
with true commercial freedom, for it is more or less hampered
by the deliberate processes and the rigid rules which are essential
to an honest and prudent handling of public moneys. The more
-complex the enterprise the louder the call for a free hand, and
the greater the city's embarrassment.
As the undertaking is not devoted to governmental use the
'State cannot deal with it at pleasure, but, because it is not so
-devoted, creditors may pursue it and superior authorities tax it.
When an undertaking is established, its conduct is subject to
'State regulation and supervision; and it cannot be transferred or
discontinued without the State's consent, nor yet by the State's
-order, unless this respects whatever municipal property rights
-would be impaired by its execution.
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At present the propaganda for municipal operation shows signs
of abatement. Here, the cost of acquiring private works has far
exceeded expectations; there, a debt limit has blocked the way.
But, quite apart from these local checks, the propaganda, as a
business proposition, seems to have lost ground generally.
I think it has lost ground as an adjunct to municipal home rule,
for, whatever the just claims of a community to self-government,
it is perceived that a commonwealth cannot safely give its cities a
free rein in business adventures. In truth, the State supervision
being demanded for public service companies must, in matters of
finance, be intensified for municipal operating authorities; for the
former are spending their own money while the latter handle
public funds-other people's money. By thus enlarging its sphere
of activity a community would invite a deeper intervention in
its affairs by the State, acting through a centralized bureaucracy.
More manifestly, municipal operation is losing -ground as a
business proposition. Foreign experience does not seem to be
generally encouraging, and while domestic experiments are too
few to furnish a decisive argument pro or con, prudent men are
coming to realize the obstacles in the way of a satisfactory mu-
nicipal operation of complex business enterprises.
Whatever the future course of the movement for municipal
operation, the weakening of business support leaves room for the
predominance of revolutionary ideas.
I am inclined to think the movement will more and more reflect
political theories of a socialistic type. Not all its advocates will
profess the creed of socialism, but its advocacy will increasingly
display that cocksureness of the business capacity of communities
this creed parades, and that intolerance of facts and figures which
characterizes its presentation.
The attitude of trade unionism is of interest in this relation.
Public authorities must keep an "open shop," but certificate legis-
lation may here and there give a substantial preference to union
labor; and in the matter of wages and hours public employees
may have an apparent advantage over private by way of legisla-
tion and by political pressure. But far-sighted unionist leaders
realize that socialism does not promise that stimulus to industrial
enterprise which affords the best opportunity for the working-
man.
The apparent abatement of the movement is not accompanied
by abatement of that mistrust of public service companies which
so greatly c6ntributed to its inception.
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Now, so far as existing companies are concerned, they cannot
be bought out against their will, nor expropriated without just
compensation for whatever property they possess; and in this
property are included all valid franchises, even those which may
have been granted improvidently.
The making of improvident grants has suffered a check, and
with this wholesome reaction there is a growing inclination toward
arrangements between public authorities and operating companies,
wherein the former will not give away exorbitant rights in the
public highways and the latter will perform the needed services
upon assurances of opportunity for a reasonable reward.
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